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Strategic Studies Institute
Key Insights:
• Competing deﬁnitions of terrorism and war yield different diplomatic, legal, and military
consequences. The deﬁnition a policymaker chooses is a key consideration.
• The United States deﬁned the September 11, 2001, attacks as acts of war rather than crimes
outside a war context. The resulting response was due in part to a lack of legal ﬂexibility in
U.S. law, not understanding the power imbedded in criminal categorization, and reliance on
structural changes for solutions.
• European countries have a long history of individually and collectively responding to
terrorism through their legal systems and the United States could proﬁt from examining those
responses.
• Latin America has a long history of contending with terrorism in a context of guerrilla
warfare.
• Strategists and policymakers often incorrectly view the Islamic world as homogeneous and
unchanging in its relationship to the West and to terrorism.
• Policy formulation could beneﬁt from the many historical examples, some in U.S. history, of
problems associated with applying laws of war to insurgencies and other irregular warfare.
• The United States should avoid: (1) limiting itself by adopting overly simple deﬁnitions;
(2) characterizing offending groups by a tactic used and forgetting they have many other
dimensions; (3) one-dimensional reactions to attacks; and (4) underestimating the value of legal
solutions to international problems.
The John Bassett Moore Society of International Law, University of Virginia School of Law, in cooperation
with the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, sponsored a conference, “Beyond the U.S. War
on Terrorism: Comparing Domestic Legal Remedies to an International Dilemma,” on February 25-26, 2005.
Over 160 people participated in the conference conducted at The University of Virginia. Conference participants
included representatives from government agencies involved in the U.S. war on terrorism, students and faculty
members from other universities participating in ﬁelds related to the topic of the conference, and members of the
local community and the University of Virginia.

emphasizing structural changes to increase security,
rather than personnel solutions, was a mistake.
Collectively, their advice to the U.S. Government was
to treat perpetrators as criminals, add ﬂexibility to the
legal system for more efﬁcient prosecution, and rely
on existing enforcement organizations, but enhance
their capabilities by recruiting the right people and
offering the right training.

The conference program was designed to discuss
international legal remedies to terrorism in terms
of: (1) the importance of deﬁnitions for war and
terrorism, (2) the evolution of U.S. political and legal
responses to terrorism, (3) the long and rich European
experience, (4) the lessons from Latin America about
terrorism and the dangers of oppressive reactions, (5)
the Islamic world’s role in and reaction to terrorism,
and (6) the relationship between terrorism and the law
of the battleﬁeld. A panel, with members drawn from
diverse backgrounds, was dedicated to each of these
topics.

The Long and Robust European Experience.
The third panel presented two examples of how
European countries individually (Germany) and
collectively (European Union) respond to terrorism
and contended that the United States could proﬁt
from examining those responses. Germany recognized
the Islamic terrorist threat, but rejected the metaphor
of war in favor of its constitutional law framework.
That commitment provides for the same civil liberty
protections for all acts, whether or not committed by
citizens, and without regard for motivation.
The European Union (EU) has experienced
monumental challenges with its efforts to expand its
member countries, maintain its collective security,
slowly eliminate internal borders, and concurrently
encourage expansion of international trade. The EU
certainly has not solved all of its external or internal
border issues, but the United States can proﬁt from
its border protection and migration management
organizational and technological efforts, in both preand post-9/11 years.

The Importance of Deﬁnitions
for War and Terrorism.
The three panel members agreed on one theme,
that deﬁnitions matter. Each elaborated on that theme
to show how deﬁnitions of terrorism and war have
diplomatic, legal, and military consequences.
Combining the terms into the phrase “war on
terrorism” creates an even greater deﬁnitional problem,
for it is used as a metaphor, an international response
to a speciﬁc enemy, a description of an international
armed conﬂict, and a proxy for long-standing internal
conﬂicts. Each meaning has its usefulness; as a
national or international unifying construct, a strategic
campaign plan, or as an explanation and predictor of
current and future international conﬂicts. But without
agreement about the meaning of a hostile event, we
can expect many different reactions to that event and
an equal number of disagreements about the legality
or legitimacy of subsequent reactions. U.S. reactions
have been both curative and preventative, and have
been clearly “war” in some places but not globally.
Military lawyers have resisted world-wide application
of a single set of operational laws, opting instead for a
situational interpretation of legal concepts.

The Lessons from Latin America.
Like Europe, Latin America has a long history of
contending with terrorism, but unlike Europe, in a
context of guerrilla warfare. Though guerrilla warfare
may be conducted without terrorist tactics, the
association in Latin America was so prevalent that the
two were often perceived incorrectly as the same. A
derivation of terrorism that occurred in other regions,
but became particularly common in Latin America
was terrorism sponsored by the State. In many cases,
dictatorships provided direction and support to
groups that attacked the government’s opponents
using tactics of terrorism.
The region-wide level of terrorism has decreased
in recent years, but remains high in some areas. In
particular, Colombia and, to lesser extents, Venezuela
and spill-over areas around Colombia continue to
experience signiﬁcant rates of terrorism. In Colombia,
a hierarchical and fractured society, both parties to the

The Evolution of U.S. Political
and Legal Responses to Terrorism.
The panel addressed three aspects of U.S. political
and legal reactions to September 11, 2001. Panelists
agreed that the U.S. response has been inadequate,
but varied in the nature of and explanation of its
inadequacy. One panelist thought the U.S. legal
system, unlike European systems, has inadequate
ﬂexibility; another believed that deﬁning activity
as terrorist warfare rather than criminal enhanced
perpetrators’ status, thereby providing them what
they wanted; and, the ﬁnal panelist thought that
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remains their primary interrogation means. The focus
of the ﬁght against terrorists should shift from the
army to the police.
Saudi Arabia’s royal family has long feared the
country’s religious leaders and avoids alienating
them. The country systematically uses anti-Western
propaganda to avoid or slow inﬂuences from western
culture. Saudi Arabia also resents the United States
for undermining Saudi leadership of OPEC, ignoring
Saudi advice about Iraq, and other policies. After a
brief liberalization in 2002-03, the Saudi government
again became conservative to accommodate religious
leaders. Saudi Arabia’s reaction to physical attacks
on its homeland has been to confront military aspects
of terrorism; it has not, however, confronted its
philosophical aspects. For the United States to gain
endorsement from Saudi Arabia’s Muslim leaders,
it must correct perceptions of U.S. human rights
violations, settle the Israel-Palestinian conﬂict, and
begin exiting Iraq.
Finally, a new norm seems to be evolving in jihad
behavior, that of self-annihilatory violence (suicide
bombing). The Koran provides no compelling support
for martyrdom, and Sunni tradition is decidedly on
the side of compromise to avoid death. At least one
branch of Shiite tradition celebrates martyrdom, but
that tradition is far from gaining universal acceptance.
Basing tactics on utilitarian adaptations such as
suicide bombings, rather than relying on ideological
absolutes for guidance, may cause long-term damage
to Muslim jurisprudence. Unfortunately, few Muslims
in positions of religious authority are discussing this
theological issue.

civil war have escalated terror against civilians, but
the 50-year conﬂict has largely moved to rural areas.
In the United States the conﬂict is seen as primarily
about drugs and a sub-war of the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT); Colombians see it differently, but
are willing to publicly represent the war in U.S. terms
to obtain U.S. support.
Most of Latin America is committed to defense
against terrorism through “rule of law.” Many Latin
Americans were killed on September 11, 2001, and
the lingering impact of regional terrorism was a huge
economic loss, through reduced tourism and trade. The
Organization of American States (OAS) began efforts
in the mid-1990s to address terrorism by creating
legal standards, denying sanctuary, and cooperating
to punish offenders. Those efforts received impetus
in 2001 and expanded to emphasize training for port
security.
The Islamic World’s Role in
and Reaction to Terrorism.
To view the Islamic world as either homogeneous
or unchanging in its relationship to the West or to
terrorism is tempting but incorrect. Experts on Turkey,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Islamic law provided
examples of a dynamic region and religion. Turkey is
a Muslim democracy that has used tough measures
to suppress insurrection, but recently has turned to
more liberal methods and increased its tolerance for
freedom of expression. Its desire to become part of
the EU has accelerated the country’s turn westward.
That western orientation has, in turn, fueled internal
conﬂict. The West has heralded Turkey as a democratic
model for other Middle Eastern countries. The Turks
see their democracy as a product of their national
context and think other Muslim states must follow
their own paths.
Pakistan is ﬁghting terrorism while also
contending with widespread lawlessness, ungoverned
regions, and a serious lack of resources. It has
successfully initiated some high level international
cooperation and obtained technical resources, but
these accomplishments have changed nothing for
police ofﬁcers in communities. These police forces
must contend with the huge rift between followers of
the secular tradition and jihad, who constitute only
5 to 10 percent of the population, but are thoroughly
entrenched in some communities. Resources go to the
military rather than the police. Hence, the police still
have no interprovince communication and no link
to Army intelligence. They lack training, and torture

Relationships between Terrorism
and the Law of the Battleﬁeld.
Historical examples, many involving the United
States, of problems associated with applying laws
of war to insurgencies and other irregular warfare
abound. Soldiers and leaders must take existing law
and apply it to their particular situation. This often
results in the adjustment, change, or evolution of
law. Examples of adjustments by governments and
insurgents can be found in Chechnya, Israel, and
Iraq.
In Chechnya, the rebels and Russian army both
changed tactics from the ﬁrst to second war. The ﬁrst
was bloody and included much direct conventional
warfare. In the second, insurgent tactics shifted
to urban guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks;
rebels introduced suicide attacks and more direct
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its security; treat opponents as complex organizations
with various motives and means; better understand
consequences of its actions for enemies, its own
citizens, and the international legal order; and more
easily accept the responsibility to conduct international
affairs in harmony with international law.

roles for women. When choosing tactics, insurgents
consider four audiences: opposing government, their
own organization, constituent public opinions and
international public opinion. The Russian government
changed tactics in reaction to rebel initiatives, not from
lessons learned in the earlier war.
Israel deﬁnes the current style of attacks on
their citizens as “armed conﬂict short of war.” Their
defense forces hastily responded with three new
programs: (1) targeted individual killings; (2) assigned
residence (deportation); and (3) fence construction.
Targeted individual killings were considered legal
if intelligence was sufﬁcient to conﬁrm the identity
of targets, and unreasonable collateral damage was
avoided. The program was evaluated as successful
because replacement enemy leaders are less effective,
and the program keeps the enemy on the run. Assigned
residence, deemed ineffective, has been discontinued.
Fence construction was begun with misgiving, but
proved to be practical at reducing inﬁltration. Where
fences were constructed, terror events were reduced
by 90 percent.
Iraq offers examples of applying rules of war to
ﬁscal, legal, contractual, and detention problems. The
context of conducting combat operations in a sovereign
nation is an important consideration, but supporting
troops in small unit day-to-day operations is the
greatest challenge. Legal support was designed to help
soldiers understand the rule of law, reduce unnecessary
suffering by both combatants and noncombatants,
and cope with war’s inherent brutality. Measures that
help reach this goal include lawyer assistance in the
targeting process, adopting a gradual response policy,
relying on precision munitions and other technological
advances, and ﬂexibility in operating procedures.
Even the best intended military policies and
comprehensive programs will not eliminate all
violations of the laws of war. They can, however,
establish a clear legal line, reduce the frequency of
violation, and punish violators. Leaders who have
formal training and legal support systems enhance
effectiveness.

*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of the author
and do not necessarily reﬂect the ofﬁcial policy or position
of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense,
or the U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s
programs may be found on the Institute’s Homepage at
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ or by calling (717) 245-4212.

The Way Ahead.
The United States should avoid limiting itself by
adopting overly simple deﬁnitions; characterizing
offending groups by a tactic used and forgetting
they have many other dimensions; one-dimensional
reactions to attacks; and underestimating the value of
legal solutions. If these pitfalls are avoided, the United
States can better understand the nature of threats to
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